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THE LAW OF TELEGRAPHS AND TELEGRAMS.
This branch of jurisprudence is an excellent instance of the
flexibility of the common law in adapting itself to new subjbobs
as they are brought from time to time within the .range of judicial action. The right to reason by analogy from things which
are settled in order to establish principles to govern things which
are unsettled, can never be abandoned in any well-sustained system of law. Lord BACON, in one of his essays, mentions this
analogical method of reasoning as one of the striking peculiarities of the jurist, and as worthy of attention by the general
scholar as a means of education. He says :-c If a man's wit
be wandering, let him study the mathematics; if his wit be not
apt to distinguish or find differences, let him study the schoolmen ; if he be not apt to beat over matters, and to call .lpon
one thing to prove and illustrate another, let him study the lawyer's cases :" Essay 50; Of Studies. The greatest care is to be

taken in these new subjects not to press the argument-from
analogy too far. Lord MANSFIELD'S caution is to be continually
borne in mind-nullum simile e8t idem. Illustrations of both
these principles will be furnished in the examination of telegrapi
law. In a subject so entirely new, the analogies must necessarily
be remote and difficult of apprehension. There will thus be
large opportunities for differences of opinion among judges.
Thus, if the question be whether a telegraph company is a comVOL. XIL-18
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mon carrier, on the one hand it may be urged that as a leading
characteristic of a common cairier is to take and have possession
of goods, and as the telegraph line does not have goods, therefore it is not a common carrier; on the other hand, it may be
said, that as a telegraph company is bound by its advertisements
or by statute to carry fQr all persons a commodity (intelligence)
which may be bought- and sold in the market, the public nature
of its employment likens it to a common carrier. It would be
urged that if there were no postal laws, and a person should for
all the public carry letters containing intelligence, he would
clearly be a common carrier; but as the letter is only a vehicle
for the idea or information which it contains, and is only carried
for the purpose of transferring information, why not hold, that
an association which transports for all persons the information
without the letter, is a common carrier ?
Again, the question has arisen whether, if parties use telegraphic communication as the medium of a contract, the same
rules should apply as when the United States mail is resorted to.
Here it may be urged that an analogy does not exist, for the
mail is under governmental management, while the telegraph is
controlled by private enterprise.
The subject may be discussed under the following divisions:1. The relations of telegraph proprietors and their employees
.to the senders and receivers of messages.
II. The use of telegraph lines as a medium of contract.
III. The relation of the telegraph to third persons.
IV. Penalties imposed lty law upon telegraph owners.
V. Legislation upon telegraphs.
The first topic admits of several subordinate considerations.
1. The nature of the engagement of a telegraph line.
2. The duty of the line to treat all customers equally, and
without discrimination.
3. The measure of damages for failing to send the message or
for an incorrect transmission.
4. Duty of employees concerning disclosure of communications.
1. The nature of the engagement of a telegraph line.-The
principal cases in which the nature of telegraph service has been
discussed are referred to in a note.1
1 McAndrew vs. Electric Telegraph Co., 17 Com. Bench R. 3 (A. D. 1855);
-Camp vs. Western Telegraph Co., 6 Am. Law Reg. 448 ; s. c. on Appeal, 1 Met-
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To understand these decisions, it will be necessary to set forth
the statute law of the country or state in which the case was decided. Notwithstanding the fact that statute law enters largely
into these adjudications; still general principles may be extracted,
both because the statutes upon telegraphs in the various states
are strikingly similar (having been apparently derived from the
same source), and because they furnish an occasion for the application of the rules and principles of the-common law. The cases
will be examined in chronological order.
In McAndrew vs. The Blectrie Telegraph 0o., 17 Com. B. R.
3, it appeared that the plaintiff sent his telegram subject to the
following conditions, of which he had due notice :-- The public
are informed that in order to provide against mistakes in the
transmission of messages by the electric telegraph, every message
of consequence ought to be repeated by being sent back from
the station at which it is to be received to the station from which
it is originally sent. Half the usual price for transmission will
be charged for repeating the message. The company will not be
responsible for mistakes in the transmission of unrepeated messages, from whatever cause they may arise."
The message in question was an "unrepeated message ;" and
in its transmission by the company, in consequence of the similarity of the characters representing the two words, the word
"Southampton" was read by the clerk at the terminal station
instead of " Hull." The plaintiff's ship went in accordance with
the supposed advice to Southampton, and sustained a considerable loss upon the cargo. An action for damages was consequently brought against the telegraph company.
It further appeared, among other things, by the various English legislative acts regulating telegraphs, it had been provided,
", that the use of any telegraph erected or formed for the purpiose
of receiving or sending messages * * should, subject to Such
reasonableregulations as may be from time to time made or entered
into by the company, be open for the sending and receiving of
messages by all persons alike, without favor or preference."
Three questions arose upon this statp of facts: (1.) Whether
the notice given by the company was a regulation within the'
calf
Cal.
Co.,
New

(Ky.) 164, 6 Am. Law Reg. 734; Parks vs. Alta California Teleg. Co., 13
422 (A. D. 1859); Dryburg vs. New York and Washington Printing Teleg.
85 Penn. St. R. 298 (A. D. 1860) ; s. c. 8 Am. Law Reg. 490; Buirey vs.
York and Wash. Teleg. Co., 18 Md. 841 (A. D. 1862).
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language of the statute.
(2.) Whether it was reasonable.
(3.) Whether the company were common carriers. The third
point was established without serious opposition on the argument
of Byles, of counsel for the plaintiff, who brgued that as the company was bound by the act to transmit all messages for the public, it stood in the same position as carriers or innkeepers. The
first point was deemed unimportant, as, if the notice was not a
"regulation" within the statute, then the company would be in
the situation of carriers at common law. The question nder
either aspect would be whether the regulation or condition was a
reasonable one. The stress of the discussion was upon the question whether the condition was reasonable, so far as it provided
" that the company would not be responsible for mistakes in the
transmission of unrepeated messages, from whatever cause they
may arise." This was held to be reasonable, as the public had
an opportunity to transmit unimportant messages for a small
charge, and might secure accuracy in an important message at a
moderate additional expense. The case of .zett vs. Mountain,
4 East 871, was cited by a member of the court, as showing an
acquiescence of eminent counsel in the proposition that such a
condition would be valid at common law if imposed by carriers.
In Camp vs. Weatern Telegraph Co., 6 Am. Law Reg. 443,
S. c. on appeal, Id. 734, 1 Metcalfe (Ky.) 164, the telegraph
company had published a notice almost in the precise language
of that which has been quoted in the English case 'just cited.
The plaintiff having information of the conditions, sent the message subject to them, but did not require it to be repeated. A
mistake Was made in an offer to contract, whereby he lost $100.
The court held that the condition was reasonable. The line of
argument adopted was much the same' as in the English case,
and the decision was powerfully influenoed by the reasoning of
the English judges. Tie court below was of opinion that a telegraph company was not a common carrier. The Court of Appeals expressed no direct opinion on this point, but seems to have
assumed that the company was a common carrier by its close
ad6ption of the line of argument resorted to in the English case.
In Parks vs. Alta California Telegraph Co., 18 Cal. 422, it
appeared that the law of California (Laws of 1850, p. 370) provided, "cThat it should be the duty of the owner of a telegraph
line to receive despatches from and for other telegraph lines and
associations, and from and for any individual, and, on payment

THE LAW OF TELEGRAPHS AND TELEGRAMS.

of their usual charges for individuals for transmitting despatchesi
as established by the rules and regulations of such telegraph
lines, to transmit the same with impartiality and good faith."
The defendant had contracted with the plaintiff for the immediate despatch of a message from his residence to Stockton,
directed to the plaintiff's agent, and requiring him to attach the
property of the plaintiff's debtor. There was a delay occasioned
by the gross neglect of one of the telegraphic operators, so that
other creditors obtained prior attachments on the debtor's property. The debtor having become insolvent, and totally unable
to pay the plaintiff's claim, the telegraph company was held liable,
The plaintiff gave evidence at the trial tending to show that an
attachment could have been obtained in his behalf if the messag6
had been transmitted in due time, or if he had been told that it
could not be transmitted, he would have secured the debt by visiting Stockton in person. The language of the court is very clear
and precise to the point, that telegraph companies are common
carriers. It says :-cc The rules of law which govern-the liability
of telegraph companies, are not new. They are old rules applied
to new circumstances. Such companies hold themselves out to
the public as engaged in a particular branch of business, in which
the interests of the public are deeply concerned. They propose
to do a certain service for a given price. There is no difference
in the general nature of the legal obligation of the contract between carrying a message along a, wire and carrying goods or a
package along a route. The physical agency may be different,
but the essential nature of the contract is the same. The breach
of contract, in one case or the other, is or may'be attended with
the same consequences, and the obligation to perform the stipu.
lated duty is the same in both cases. The importance of the di&
charge of it, in. both respects, is the same. In both cases .th
contract is binding, and the responsibility of the parties for tho
breach of duty is governed by the same general rules. * * *
The process of ascertainment is the same as in other eases of
carriers."
Thus far the action has been brought by the sender of the
message who received it in several of the instances urider express
conditions. The next instance presents a new aspect. TM
action is brought by the receiver of the message for its inaciwh
rate transmission, causing him injury. It is evident that-b new
class of considerations is presented. Assuming that the sender
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has not submitted to the conditions, and has sent an unrepeated
message, is the receiver bound by the acts of the sender? Is
the telegraph company the agent of the sender, so that the rule
of respondeat superior applies, and the only person liable to the
receiver is the sender ? These and other questions were presented
in the case of the New York and Washington PrintingTelegraph
Co. vs. Dryburg, 85 Penn. State R. 298. A Mr. LeRoy of New
York had transmitted, subject to the usual conditions, to a florist
in Philadelphia, a message for two hand bouquets. The operator
reading the word " hand" as hund, added the letters " red," so
that the message read " two hundred' bouquets."
The florist
having procured a large quantity of expensive flowers, which
LeRoy refused to take, brought an action against the company
for damages sustained. The company was held liable. The
propositions decided were that the rule of the company concerning repeated messages, did not excuse them from negligence and
especially from liability for loss occasioned by sending a different
message from the one ordered; that if it did excuse them in an
action by the sender" it was no defence to an action brought by
the receiver; that if the telegraph company was'.an agent for
the sender, it was still liable- for misfeasance to the receiver, ard
that in the case of misfeasance, the action of respondeat superior
was not applicable. The court was further of the opinion that
the obligations of the company, like those of common carriers,
spring from the same sources-the public nature of their employment and the contract under which the particular duty is assumed.
There appears to be no general statute in Pennsylvania concerning telegraph companies, so that these conclusions were arrived
at upon general or common law principles. See, also, Bowen &
McNamee vs. The Lake Erie Telegraph Co., in the Court of
Common Pleas of Ohio, coram STARKWEATHER, J., with a jury:
1 Am. Law Reg. 685 (A. D. 1858).
The only case further to be cited on this branch of the subject
is Rirney vs. New York and Washington Telegraph Co., 18 Maryland R. 841. The Maryland Code provides that "cany person
or association owning any telegraph line doing business within
this state, shall receive despatches from and for other telegraph
lines and associatiohs, and from and for any individual for transmitting despatches as established by the rules and regulations of
such telegraph line, and shall transmit the same with impartiality
and good faith," &c.,&c. The language'italicised in this statute
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is quite peculiar, and would seem to permit the company to exercise a power which is not usually conferred upon common carriers,
who, as is well known, cannot modify their common law liability
by a mere rule of their own.
In the case in question, the company had established the rule,
so often referred to, concerning unrepeated messages. No repeating price or insurance was paid by the plaintiff. He delivered
to the agent of the company a message*to be transmitted, which
was never sent, but was wholly forgotten by the agent. It was
held, notwithstanding the statute and the notice, that the company was liable. The notice did not apply to the case where no
effort was made by the company or its agents to put a message
on its transit.
The court, in the course of its decision, expressed the opinion
that a telegraph company could not be under the same liabilities
as a common carrier, for the reason elaborated by the defendant's
counsel on the argument. The common carrier could go with'the
goods and inspect the condition of his vehicles, the safety of the
roads, and bad the exclusive custody of the goods. None of these
facts were true of the telegraph company, whose business is liable
to casualties and delays which it has no power to foresee or to avoid.
'This view, however, is rather ingenious than solid. The great
reason for the common carrier's responsibility is the publio nature
of his employment and the fact that he is unreservedly intrusted
with the interests and property of the bailor. Public policy demands the application of a stern rule of responsibility in the one
case as much as in the other.
The propositions which may be deduced .from these cases appear to be these:(1.) If a telegraph company holds itself out to carry messages
in the ordinary way, it takes upon itself a public employment
analogous to that of a common carrier. Although it may not be
in all respects an insurer, it is bound to exercise the utmost diligence and good faith. When a statute requires it to transmit
messages for all who may send them, the case is still more clear.
. (2.) The company may, on the like analogy, make reasonable
conditions. It may require important niessages to be repeated
at an additional charge as a condition to its liability. This is
but little more than providing that an unimportant message may
be sent for a small price, and one that is important may be safely
transmitted for a larger sum. This increased sum must be

200

THE LAW OF TELEGRAPHS AND TELEGRAMS.

intended as an equivalent for the additional labor required and
risk run, and must therefore be reasonable in amount. The same
result is reached if a statute permits the company to establish
rules and regulations, for it is implied that such regulations
should be reasonable.
(3.) The condition referred to in the second proposition does
.not cover oases where negligence has been established, as where
the agent negligently fails altogether to transmit the message, or
where he of his own volition substitutes another message in room
of the one sent, on the erroneous supposition that such was the
eunder's intention,
(4.) The receiver of the message is in a different position from
the sender. Assuming that the company could stipulate with
the sender not to be responsible for the acts of its agents, such
a stipulation would. not bind the receiver, who could not know
whether the message had been repeated or not. The company
cannot shield itself from an action by the receiver on the ground
that it is the agent of the sender, for the maxim resondeat auperior does not apply to the case of misfeasance.
In many cases, the question of the liability of telegraph proprietors is presented in more complicated forms than those which
have been already discussed. The message, before its destination
is reached, is passed over more than a single line, and an attempt
is made to hold the receiving company responsible for the misconduct or negligence of the other companies composing the continuous route. This point was presented in Stevenson vs. Mrre
Montreal Telegraph Go., 16 Upper Can. R. 580. The defendants owned a telegraph extending to Buffalo, but advertised their
line as "connecting with all the principal cities and towns in
Canada and the United States." They received payment for
transmission to places beyond their line. A message was sent
by the plaintiff from Montreal to New York, paying the entire
charge. It was held by. a divided court, that the only duty of
the defendants was to deliver the message at Buffalo to the connecting American line. A dissenting judge was of opinion that
the defendants were liable, upon an undertaking to transmit the
message to New Yorc and deliver it there. The majority of the
court thought that the announcemen t that the Montreal telegraph
line " connected" with the cities in the United States, only meant
that such arrangements were made as" would insure to the public
the convenience of their messages being taken up and forwarded
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to cities'to which the operations of the Canada line do not extend.
It was also thought that a contract to deliver the message at New.
York could not be implied from the receipt of the whole charge,
as this arrangement was for the convenience of the plaintiff, and
relieved him from the employment of an agent at the c6mmencement of the American line. The case of Do lutte vs. The New
York, Albany and Buffalo Telegraph Co., now pending before
the Court of Common Pleas in the city of New York, presents
the same question. The sender of the message paid the entire
price of its transmission from New York to California to the
defendants. There was a number of distinct companies forming
a continuous line, but having no connection with each other,
except that each received the tariff for all the lines over which
messages were to be sent, at a rate fixed by each company for
itself. Each company accounted and settled with ita connecting.
line. Important mistakes in transmitting the message having ,
been made by one of the western lines, the receiver, who sus-'
tained damage, brought his action against the defendants. The.
jury, under the direction of the presiding judge, tound a Terdict
for the plaintiff. In the case of Leonard vs. Burton, in the Supreme Court of New York, at General Term, 5th District, the
message was correctly delivered by the company which received
it, but a mistake was made by.the proprietors of the connecting
line. An action was brought against the latter, and was sustained, apparently on the ground that the first company was an
agent of the second. This case has been appealed. In this eentrariety of opinion further adjudication is necessary. In New.
York and other states a statutory duty is imposed upon each
telegraph company to receive telegrams for other companies aqwell as for individuals. It would seem that there is no sufficienf
reason why the 'same principle should not be applied to telegraph
associations as has been already adopted in the case of railroad
companies which sell tickets for a point beyond 'their rout-,'"
receiving the entire fare.
2. The duty of the line to treat all customers equal4g and
without discrimination.-If the telegraph owners are common
carriers, it follows as a matter of course that they must act with
impartiality towards their customers: 2 Pars. on Contracts, pt
206, 5th ed. This obligation is, however, often imposed by ew.
press statute : See Laws of New York, 1848, p. 392, and similar
acts in other states. In an English statute it was provided that'
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" a telegraph line should be open for- the sending and receiving
of messages by all persons alike, without favor or preference,
and subject to such equitable charges and to such reasonable
regulations as may from time to time be made by the said company."
An agreement was made between the plaintiff and the telegraph company governed by this statute, that he would collect
public intelligence and send it over their line exclusively. Fifty
per cent. was to be returned to him, or in other words, his messages were to be sent for half-price. The court was of opinion
that this allowance was not in violation of the statute, for the
arrangement was rather a remuneration for services in collecting
r ublic intelligence and bringing custom to the company than any
I reference or partiality to the plaintiff in the use of the telegraph: Ileuter vs. Bldetrie Telegraph Co., 6 E. & B. 841 (A. D.

1856).
•8. The measure of damages for failing to send the message.In order to determine this point accurately, it will be useful to
state the rules.*hich are now settled respecting damages in cases
of contract and tort respectively. When an action is brought
on a contract, the rule is laid down by the Court of Appeals in
New York in these terms: -riffinvs. Colver, 16 N. Y. (2 Smith)
489 :-cc The broad general rule in such cases is, that the party
injured is entitled to recover all his damages, including gains prevented as well as losses sustained, and this rule is subject to but
two conditions: the damages must be such as may fairly be supposed to have entered into the ,contemplation of the parties when
they made the contract, that is, must be such as might naturally
be expected to follow its violation; and they must be certain,
both in their nature and in respect to the cause from which they
proceed."
The rule was enunciated in nearly similar terms in England:
Hadley vs. Baxendale (Co. Exch.), 9 Exch. R. 341 :-" Where
two parties have made a contract which one of them has broken,
the damages which the other party ought to receive should be
either such as may fairly and substantially be considered as
arising naturally, i. e., according to the usual course of things,
from such breach of contract itself, or such as may reasonably
be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties at
the time they made the contract, as the probable result of the
breach.of it." This rule, though having the merit of precision
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in terms, is confessedly difficult of application.

08

The English

courts uniformly profess to follow it,. although recognising the
shadowy didtinctions to which they are sometimes driven.
In a recent instructive case, Gee vs. Lancashireand Yorkshlire
Railway Co., 6 H. & N. R. 210 (A. D. 1860), the plaintiffs were
possessed of a cotton-mill, and engaged the defendants to transport to them, from Liverpool, cotton to be manufactured.- Tie
cotton was not delivered in accordance with the contract, and the
plaintiffs claimed damages for the loss of wages of workmen
whom they had employed, and of profits that they would haye
made by working the mill. It appeared that the plaintiffs .hal
no other cotton which they could manufacture, and that the att i4
tion of the railway company was froth time to time called to t4
fact that the mill was at a stand-still for want of cotton, althiough
this was only done after the contract for transportati6n was me6,
and during the delay in the delivery. The judge at ie ir4 al
ruled, as a matter of law, that the plaintiff was entitled to recov'dr
for loss of profits and wages, but the 'court of review held that
the question should have been left to the jury tdetermine fro
the evidence whether the stoppage 'of the mill was the uittk
consequence of the nondelivery of the cotton. It was intimined
that the result was right, although it was not reached in the 6rrect manner. Baron WILDE appeared to be dissatisfiea with
Hadley vs. Baxendale, making these remarks :-" For my own
part I think that, although an excellent attempt was ma6 in
Hadley vs. Baxendale to lay down a rule on the subject, it will
'be found that the rule is not capable of 'meeting all cases " and
when the matter comes to be further considered, it will probably
turn out that there is no such thing as a rule, as to the legal'm sure of damages, applicable to all cases:" p. 221.
(1.) Actions by senders of messages.-The rule in. Adzdfk
vs. Baxendale is very severe in its application to the senders
It is almost impossible, in many
of telegraphic messages.
instances, to 'ommunicate the result of a 'neglect to desp Ch
Since it has been settled that the condition
the mesgage.
requiring an important message to be repeated for an additional price is valid, it is worthy, of consideration whether the
telegraph company should not be held responsible for all the
direct consequences following its neglect of duty, without reference to the question whether they were contemplated by thb
parties or not. But few cases have yet been decided in whi4
the measure of damages was discussed. One of these is Wash-
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ington Telegraph Co. vs. Hfodson, 15 Grattan (Va.) 122. An
order to purchase 5000 bales of cotton was altered by the company so as to read 25,000. As soon as the mistake was discovered, the plaintiff's factors were notified by the telegraph company. It was held if the company was liable at all, the damages
were the loss on an immediate resale of the surplus, with all
charges and factor's commissions. The plaintiffs were bound to
give immediate notice, to the telegraph proprietors that they must
either take and pay for the surplus or it would be sold on their
account, and the loss charged to them. Another authority is
Landsberger vs. Magnetie Telegraph Co., 82 Barb. 580 (A. D.
1860), s. P. Shields vs. Washington Telegraph Co., 5th- Dist.
Court, New Orleans, 9 West. Law Jour. 288, in which an action
was brought for damages for neglecting to. deliver a despatch
from New Orleans to New York, according to agreement. The
plaintiff having contracted with a third person to buy goods for
him, and to receive a commission for his services, bound himself
to carry out the contract in a ppecific sum as liquidated damages.
He forwarded ,money, to New York to fulfil the agreement.
Through the neglect of the telegraph company he failed to
accomplish his intention, so that he was deprived of his commissions, was obliged to pay the liquidated damages, and lost the
use of his money for a specified time. It was held that he could
only recover the cost of the telegraphic despatch and the interest
of his money while it lay idle. The loss of the commissions and
the payment of the liquidated damages were not regarded as
having " entered into the contemplation. of the parties when the
contract was made," within the rule of Griffin vs. Colver and
Hadley vs. BazendaZe. In Parksvs. Alta California Telegraph
Co., 13 California R. 422, the court below had rendered judgment
for the plaintiff for the cost of the despatch ($2.50). The facts
were that the plaintiff- hAd. sent a. message to his agent in another
*eity,, directing him to procure an attachment against a debtor
.There was evidence tending to show that if the message had been
piopexly sent, the attaphiment would have, been secured, or that
ifthe plaintiff had been informed that it would- not be sent, he
could have secured the debt by his personal exertions. In consequence of a failure to obtain tbLe attachment, the debt was
entirely lost. The court, in sending the case back for a new
trial ,was of opinion that the entire damage sustained by the
plaintiff should be recovered. This case can only be reconciled
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with Landsberger vs. Magnetic Telegraph Co., by the supposition
that there was enough in the California case to give the company
notice of the object of the message, and thus that the damages
were such as might naturally be expected to be derived from the
company's neglect. Assuming that the rule of law is correctly
enunciated in Landsberger vs. Magnetic Telegraph Co., where
the action is on contract, the sender might desire to frame his
action in tort, in order to obtain a different rule of damages.
This brings ul to an examination of the rule of damages prevailing in an action of tort. The inquiry here is whether the damage
complained of is the direct and reasonable result of the defendant's act, without reference to the question whether it was contemplated by the parties. In order to determine whether an
action of tort may be brought, it may be, necessary to examine
the statutes to see if some statutory duty is cast upon the company, on failure of whose performance an action on the case may
lie, without any reference to the contract. Thus in New York,
by the Laws of 1848, chap. 265, it is made the duty of the telegraph company to transmit despatches in the order in which they
are received, under a penalty to be recovered by the person
whose despatch is postponed out of its order. On general principles, the injured party might bring an action on the case for
the damages sustained by a failure to comply with the statute,
although, under the NeW York act, a specific penalty having been
given to the party aggrieved, no more than the penalty can be
recovered. See this topic fully explained in Couch vs. &e el, 8
Ellis & Blackburn 402.
(2.) Damages in actions by the receiver of the message.-Ih
this class of cases, the action must be purely in tort, and the r ulb
of damages will follow principles applicable to that kind of
actions. )Jryburg vs. New York and Washington P~intin&
Telegraph Co., 85 Penn. State R. 298, is illustrative of this principle. The plaintiff having wasted, in consequence of the defendant's erroneous message, flowers for two hundred bouquets, was
allowed to recover for the entire damage sustained: Bowen &
MeNamee vs. The Lake Brie Telegraph Co., 1 Am. Law Reg.
685.
4. The duty of telegraph employees as to disclosure of communications.-There is no doubt that the employees of telegraph'
companies are bound by the very nature of their business not to
disclose such communications as were intended by the parties to
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be confidential. This proposition is established by such cases as
Tipping vs. Clark, 2 Hare 393, where Vice-Chancellor WIGRAM
said that every clerk employed in a merchant's counting-house
is under an implied contract that he will not make public that
which he learns in the execution of his duty as clerk. See, also,
Morrison vs. .oat, 9 Hare 241; .Williams vs. Williams, 3 Merivale 157 ; Yovatt vs. Wingard, 1 Jac. & W. 394; Prince AXbert
vs. Strange, 2 De G. & S. 652, 697. This unwarranted disclosure is, however, often prohibited by statute.
The remedy for a wilful breach of this duty must be sought
against the employees and not against the telegraph association.
A statute prohibiting a wilful disclosure of confidential communications would not prevent a telegraph operator from being
examined concerning the communication in a court of justice.
A Pennsylvania act declared that it should not be lawful for any
person concerned in any line of telegraph to use or make known,
or cause to be used or made known, the contents of any despatch,
of whatever nature, which might be sent or received over any
line of telegraph, without the consent or direction of either the
party sending or receiving the same; * * * and it was further provided, that if any person should use, or make known, or
in any other way unlawfully expose another's business, or acts,
he should be punishable with fine and imprisonment. It was held
that this statute did not apply to cases where it is material to
have such disclosures on a judicial trial., The act only makes
the offender liable where he unlawfully exposes the secrets of the
telegraph- office, or where it is done wantonly or voluntarily:
femsler vs. Freeman, 2 Parsons' (Penn.) Cases 274 (A. D.
1851).
II.

THE UsE

oF TELEGRAPH LINES AS A MEDIUM OF CONTRACT.

(1.) It has now become a settled'rule of law, that where the
United States mail is used as a medium of contract, and a proposal
is made by letter, and an answer of acceptance is deposited in the
mail, the contract is complete, though the answer altogether fails
to reach the proposer. The minds of the parties are supposed
to have met, when the acceptance is mailed: lactiervs. Frith,
6 Wend. 103; 'assar vs. Camp, 1 Kern. 141; Tayloe vs. -iferchants' Ins. Co., 9 How. (U. S.) 390.
The question has recently arisen in New York whether this prin-
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ciple is applicable to telegraphs. The parties, residing respectively
at New York and New Orleans, agreed that their communications
should be made by telegraph. A proposal was made accordingly,
and an answer requested. The acceptance was regularly delivered
to the telegraph company, but was not transmitted, owing to
their lines being down. It was held that there was no contract
or aggregatio mentium, for the plaintiffs undertook, in point of
law, to bring home to the defendants knowledge of the acceptance. The communication is only initiated when it is delivered
to the telegraphic operator. It is completed when it comes to
the possession of the party for whom it is designed. The court
was of opinion that the rule laid down by the authorities in reference to communications by mail, was not applicable, for the reason, among others, that the action of the post-office is governed by
law, while the telegraph is controlled by private enterprise : Trevor
vs. Wood, 41 Barb. 255 (A. D. 1864).
(2.) The telegraph operator may be deemed the agent of the
party who sends the message, so as to bind him to the opposite
party. Thus, if he should make an oral communication to the
operator, and the operator should by mistake send one of a different tenor, on which the other party acted in good faith, the
sender of the message would be bound on the ordinary principle
that the operator is an agent acting within the scope of his apparent authority: -Dunningvs. Roberts, 35 Barb. 463; see, also,
Washington Telegraph Co. vs. Hodson, 15 Grattan (Va.) 122.
It follows from this principle, that if the contract be one requiring signature or subscription by the Statute of Frauds, the manipulations of the operator, whereby the sender's name becomes
appended to the despatch, are equivalent to an actual personal
signature with pen and ink: Id. If, however, the message is in,
writing, and the operator voluntarily makes a material change in
its terms, the sender is not liable, and the remedy of the receiver
is against the company. Such appears to be the result of -Dry-

burg vs. The New York and Washington Telegraph Co., for if the
florist in that case acquired a claim against the sender, there
would have been no wrong done to him by the operator, and the
action should have been brought by the sender against the telegraph company as his agent, for transgressing his instructions
and occasioning damage by making him liable to the receiver.
(3.) It has been held that a contract, when made by telegrams,
must be proved in the first instance by the original despatch.
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That which is received by the person to whom it is sent, is only
a copy. If the despatch is sought to be used in evidence, the
original must be produced, and its execution proved precisely as
any other instrument, or its absence accounted for in the same
mode, before a copy can be received: Matteson vs. Ygoyes, 25 Ill.
591 (A. D. 1861). With due submission, it would seem that the
contract was made by the telegrams which are received, and not
by the messages communicated to the operator. At least, such
is the deduction from the New York cases already cited: Trevor
vs. Wood, 41 Barb. 255; IDunning vs. Roberts, suyra. At all
eventg, if the message was oral, and the telegram was signed by
the receiving operator with the sender's name, the evidence to
take the case out of the Statute of Frauds would be furnished
by the receiving and not by the sending operator.
III. THE

RELATION OF THE TELEGRAPH LINE TO THIRD PERSONS, WITHOUT REFERENCE TO MESSAGES.

1. Claims by third persons against the telegraph company.,
There are two cases which may be presented in this connection.

(1.) The laying down of telegraph lines without statutory
authority.-No cases of that kind have yet been presented in
this country. They may be, however, in those states where
general statutory powers have not been conferred upon owners
of telegraph lines to erect posts upon highways, or to lay wires
along roads or across streams. The question has arisen in England: Attorney-aeneral vs. United Kingdom Bleetric Telegraph
Co., 80 Beavan 287 (A. D. 1863). The defendant was a corporation under the English Joint Stock Company Act, and without
statutory powers proceeded to lay down telegraph wires under
highways, and among others over the land of Baron Rothschild,
who, with the Attorney-General, applied to a court of equity for
an injunction. It was held that there was no such irreparable
injury to the highway and to the plaintiff Rothschild, as to justify an injunction. The question was whether there was a public
These points must be
nuisance or a right of private action.
established at law to the satisfaction of the court before the
equity can be administered. The court, however, retained the
bill until the proceedings at law were terminated.
The case was subsequently tried at a criminal court. An
indictment was found against the defendants for putting up their

THE LA.W OF TELEGRAPHS AND TELEGRAMS.

posts on a highroad, so as to obstruct the public in its use. The
defendants having been convicted, on a motion for a new trial
the Court of Queen's Bench laid down the following propositions:
First, That in the case of an ordinary highway running between
fences one on each side, the right-of passage extends to the whole
space between the fences,'and the public are entitled to the use
of the whole of it as the highway, and are not confined to the
part which may be kept in order for the, more convenient use of
carriages and foot-passengers; Second, That a permanent obstruction erected on a highway, placed there without lawful authority,
which renders the way less commodious than before, is an unlawful act, and a public nuisance at common law; and that if the
defendant placed permanent posts in the highway of such a character as to obstruct the passage of the public, they were guilty,
although the posts were not placed-on the hard part of the road,
or although sufficient space for the public traffic 'emained: 31 L.
J. N. S., Magistrates' Cases 166.
(2.) Though statutory authority is conferred upon telegraph
proprietors to lay down their lines along a highway, they are,
still bound to see that no injury happens to passengers on the
road from the bad or unsafe condition of their instruments, whether posts or wires: Dickey vs. Maine Telegraph Co., 46 Maine
483 (A. D. 1859); s. c., 8 Am. Law Reg. 358: The plaintiff,
in this case was a passenger on a stage running between two
towns. On arriving at the place of destination, the stage turned
off, in the ordinary course of business, from the usual travelled
part of the highway. A telegraph wire of the defendant, hanging too low, caught the upper part of the stage, and was the
cause of its being upset, whereby the plaintiff was damaged.
The charter authorized the company to locate and construct its
li;es along and upon .any highway, * * * by the ereQtion
of necessary fixtures, &c., c,but the same shall not be so constructed as to incommode the public use of said road or highway."
The court said :-" It is very clear that this company could not
legally erect posts only a foot in height, and extend the wires at
that distanc6 from the ground on the exterioir limits and outside
of the travelled path, if by so doing the use of any part of the
highway was obstructed, or rendered inconvenient or dangerous,
or the traveller incommoded. If any injury should arise to any
such legal traveller by such erection, he using due care, the company would be liable to him. The same rule will apply when,.
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after erections properly made, they suffer the same to fall down
or to be out of repair, and to remain so after reasonable notice,
.so as to obstruct the traveller and endanger his safety."
2. Injuries to telegraph lines by third person.-The law protects the telegraph proprietor in the enjoyment of his property,
and when his line is properly established, any injury to it may be
redressed by action. Tkiese general principles cannot be disputed. They have recently received a novel application in the
-case of a submarine telegraph line between England and France.
A Swedish vessel caused its anchor to become entangled with the
telegraph cable extending from Dover to Calais. It was held on
demurrer, that the owners of the vessel would be liable in an
English court, if negligence was established, even though the
injury occurred on the high seas, beyond three miles from the
:English shore: Submarine Telegraph Co. vs. Diekson, 15 C. B.
N. S. 759 (A. D. 1864).
.,I.

PRENATIES IMPOSEI)

oiq

TELEGRAPH COMPAIES BY STATUTE.

It is quite common in the statutes of this country to impose
penalties upon telegraph compailies for failing to perform statutory obligations. Some of these are quite heavy. But little
adjudication has yet been had upon them. Like other penal
ktatutes, they will doubtless be construed strictly. A single
instance may be cited. The California statute of 1850 imposed
a penalty of $500 upon a telegraph company for a neglect or
refusal to transmit despatches, to be recovered in the.4ame and
'for the benefit of the person or persons sending or/desiring to
send such despatch. A person offered a message td a company
(the State Telegraph) whose line extended only
part of the
distance to which the message was to be transmi ted. Having
been transmitted over its line, the message was te dered by the
State Telegraph Company to another company ( e Alta California Telegraph) for further transmission, whichwas refused.
'It was held that the plaintiff, who was the original sender of the
message, was not ",the person sending or desiring to send the
despatch" within the meaning of the statute, bqt that the State
Telegraph Company was the "sender," as far as the Alta Cali-fornia Company was concerned. "The plaintiff consequently
-failed to recover the penalty:, .Thun vs. Alta Telegraph Co., 15
*-4al. 472 (A. D. 1860).
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V.

LEGISLATION UPON TELEGRAPHS.

This article has already become so extended that telegraph
legislation can only be alluded to in general terms. Special acts
of incorporation are resorted to in some of the states, while in
others, telegraph proprietors are allowed to carry on their enterprises under general laws. The substance of these statutes is,
that the organization may take place .under prescribed terms,
and that the proprietors of the line may erect their posts along
highways without essentially interfering with public travel. The
proprietors are commonly required to transmit messages for the
public with impartiality and in good faith, and to send them in
their regular order. There is usually imposed upon employees
a duty not to make disclosures of the communications intrusted
to them. Obedience to these provisions is often secured by
penalties. Reference to the principal statutes is found in a note.'
By a recent law of Congress, telegraph lines may be taken possession of for military purposes: 12 U. S. at Large 334. Under
the internal revenue law, it is necessary that despatches be
stamped: 12 U. S. S. 475, &c.
The propositions which have been set forth in this discussion
1 No reference is made to special acts incorporating particular organizationg
in this country, but only to provisions of a general nature. ENGLAND: 16 & 17
Vict. c. 103; 25 & 26 Vict. c. 89; 26 & 27 Vict. o. 112. Nzw Youx: Laws
of 1848, ch. 265, p. 392; Laws of 1845, ch. 243, p. 264; Laws of 1862, ch. 425,
p. 761. MAINE: Rev. Stat., Title 4, ch. 53, revising Laws of 1852, ch. 237.
Naw HAMPSHIn: Compiled Statutes, p. 548, 4. VERMaoNT: Laws of 1854,
No. 33. RHODE ISLAND: Rev. Stat., Ed. 1857, p. 538. MASsAcnusrrS: Rev.
Stat. 1860, ch. 64. CoNNEcTIcuT: Compiled Laws, 1854, 210-8, 816. NZW
JEasEY: Laws of 1855, ch. 194; Laws of 1862, ch. 49. DBrAr.w~: Rev. Stat.
Ed. 1852, p. 480. MARYLAND: Code 1860, vol. 1, p. 169-172, 252. VxRaINU.:
Rev. Stat., Ed. 1849, Title 16, ch. 65; Laws of 1852, ch. 149; Laws of 1853,
ch. 27; Laws of 1854, ch. 45. LOuIsIANA: Rev. Stat., Ed. 1856, 116 and 152.
In this state there is a somewhat uncommon provision to the effect that in case
of war, insurrection, or civil commotion, the telegraph operator, on application
of an officer of the state or of the United.States, is bound to give his communication immediate despatch, on penalty of being held guilty of a misdemeanor.
The same provision is found in the Laws of Tennessee. MIdeIIAN: Compiled
Laws 1857, vol. 2, 672-8; 421-3. Ouio: Swan's Rev. Stat., Ed. 1854, ch. 29,
p. 220; Laws of 1861, p. 104. ILL NoIs: Statutes (D. B. Cooke's Ed., 1858),
1175-6-7. TENNESSEE: Code of 1858, Title 8, ch. 9. IowA: Code of 1860,
Title 11, ch. 56. MissouRi : Rev. Stat. of 1855, vol. 2, ch. 156. INDIANA: Rev.
Stat. 1852, vol. 2, 422. WiscoNsis: Rev. Stat. 1858, oh. 76, 497; KAPss :
Compiled Laws 1862, 365, 768.

